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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2854 
_____________ 
 
GREGORY KLINE, and CHERRIE KLINE, husband and wife, 
                                                                                            Appellants 
 
v. 
 
ZIMMER HOLDINGS, INC.; ZIMMER, INC.; ZIMMER U.S., INC.  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania                                                        
District Court No. 2-13-cv-00513 
District Judge: The Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
                          
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 29, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 7, 2016)                      
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION** 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Circuit Judge.   
                                                 
 Honorable D. Brooks Smith, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, 
assumed Chief Judge status on October 1, 2016. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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 On January 13, 2010, Gregory Kline underwent a total hip replacement.  His 
surgeon implanted a Femoral Stem with Kinectiv Technology.  On April 6, 2011, 
Kline’s hip replacement broke; the stem fractured at the neck.  Kline sued Zimmer 
Holdings Inc., Zimmer Inc., and Zimmer United States Inc. (collectively, 
“Zimmer”), alleging several state-law product liability claims.  By the time the 
case reached summary judgment, Kline’s only remaining claims were negligent 
design defect and negligent failure to warn.1  The District Court granted summary 
judgment to Zimmer on all counts.  Because Kline failed to show that a reasonable 
jury could find that any unreasonable act or omission by Zimmer caused him harm, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 We review the District Court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion 
de novo, applying the same standard as the District Court.  Doe v. Luzerne County, 
660 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2011).  “[W]hen the nonmoving party is the plaintiff, he 
                                                 
1 Kline’s wife, Cherrie Kline, also sued for lack of consortium.  Because Cherrie 
Kline’s claims are entirely derivative of Kline’s claims and because we will affirm 
the grant of summary judgment as to Kline’s claims, we need not perform any 
separate analysis relating to Cherrie Kline or her loss of consortium claim.  See, 
e.g., Darr Const. Co. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd., 715 A.2d 1075, 1080 
(Pa. 1998) (“It is well-settled that the [loss of consortium] claim is 
derivative . . . .”); Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing Corp., 680 F.3d 296, 300 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (“The District Court dismissed his claim for loss of consortium because 
that claim was derivative and therefore must rise or fall with his wife’s claims.”). 
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must produce sufficient evidence to establish every element that he will be 
required to prove at trial.”  J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 
F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).   
 Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show four elements to establish a 
negligence claim: duty, breach, causation, and damages.  See Phillips v. Cricket 
Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1008 (Pa. 2003); Morena v. S. Hills Health Sys., 462 
A.2d 680, 684 n.5 (Pa. 1983).  Demonstrating breach requires showing that the 
defendant acted unreasonably.  See, e.g., Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1008 (holding that 
negligence claims require an inquiry “into the reasonableness of the 
manufacturer’s conduct in creating and distributing such a product”).  
Reasonableness requires comparing the risk and the utility of the alleged acts or 
omissions.  See, e.g., Benson v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 342 A.2d 393, 397 (Pa. 
1975) (“A risk is unreasonable if it is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the 
law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.” 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291)); see also Metzgar v. Playskool, Inc., 
30 F.3d 459, 462 (3d Cir. 1994) (conducting risk-utility analysis in a negligent 
design case).  Then, a plaintiff “must demonstrate ‘the causal connection between 
the breach of a duty of care and the harm alleged: that the increased risk was a 
substantial factor in bringing about the resultant harm.’”  Green v. Pa. Hosp., 123 
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A.3d 310, 316 (Pa. 2015) (quoting Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., LLC, 57 
A.3d 582, 596 (Pa. 2012)).   
 Thus, to survive summary judgment, Kline has to show that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact that Zimmer acted unreasonably in designing the 
stem or failing to warn about the stem and that any unreasonable act was the cause 
of the harm to Kline.  Kline failed to do so.2 
 On appeal, Kline primarily contends the District Court erred because the 
District Court did not fully consider two affidavits filed after the Magistrate Judge 
first recommended granting Zimmer’s summary judgment motion.  Because these 
affidavits do not advance Kline’s reasonableness or design causation arguments, 
they do not affect summary judgment.  Therefore, this Court need not address 
Kline’s arguments that the sham affidavit doctrine was improperly applied3 or that 
certain portions of the affidavit of Klein’s surgeon were admissible. 
                                                 
2 Because the parties primarily addressed whether the District Court should or 
should not have considered certain evidence, there was little briefing on 
reasonableness.  However, Zimmer briefed the causation issue, and the record is 
clear.  See Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 796 
F.3d 293, 300–01 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We may affirm a district court for any reason 
supported by the record.” (quoting Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d 
Cir. 2011))). 
3 For the same reason, this Court does not need to determine whether the standard 
of review with regard to the sham affidavit doctrine is de novo or abuse of 
discretion.  See Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 488 F.3d 1026, 1030 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(identifying national confusion over this issue).   
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 Kline argues that the failure of the Zimmer device in another patient treated 
by Kline’s doctor—an issue raised in both affidavits—is important here.  Evidence 
about the other patient’s device failure is not admissible, however, because it did 
not “involv[e] the same product under similar circumstances,” nor did it (1) “show 
notice to the defendant of the danger,” (2) “show [the] existence of the danger,” or 
(3) “show the cause of the accident.”  Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 
97 (3d Cir. 1983).  Here, the other patient’s device failure could not show notice of 
the danger because the allegedly related device failure occurred after the Zimmer 
device already had been implanted in Kline.  The other patient’s device failure also 
does not prove the “existence of the danger” or “cause of the accident” because 
Kline fails to offer any sort of causation theory regarding the prior accident—let 
alone one related to any unreasonable act that affected his own device.  There is no 
reason to believe that whatever latent danger allegedly harmed the other patient 
had any relationship to Kline.  Kline’s lack of a causation theory for the other 
patient’s device failure means Kline failed to show that there were relevant 
“similar circumstances.”  Gumbs, 718 F.2d at 97. 
 With regard to the negligent design defect claim, the District Court held that 
Plaintiffs’ experts, Mari Truman and Dr. Donald Koss, had waived Kline’s design 
defect claims in their depositions. 
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 In fact, Truman and Koss did raise design defect theories in their expert 
reports. Although these theories were not waived, they fail at summary judgment.  
Truman and Koss’s design defect theories were that: Zimmer should have 
conducted more stringent tests; Zimmer could have used a different surface 
treatment; Zimmer should not have used the particular type of titanium it used; the 
device should not have been multimodular; the offset or size of the device was 
dangerous; or the device is inherently flawed.   
 Kline failed to produce record evidence showing any of these design choices 
were unreasonable, thus causing his device to fail.  With regard to 
unreasonableness, Kline failed to provide record evidence from which a jury could 
find that the allegedly faulty design changes increased risk more than they 
increased utility.  See Metzgar, 30 F.3d at 462 (conducting risk-utility analysis in a 
negligent design case).  See generally Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 
389–91 (Pa. 2014) (discussing risk-utility analysis).  Instead, for instance, Truman 
refers to a “NEW and foreseeable risk.”  Whether a new risk is unreasonable can 
only be determined based on a comparison with alternative risks and benefits, cf. 
Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management 
in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 309 (1985) (“[T]he rejection of one risk is 
always the acceptance of another.”), or proof that the new risk was of such 
magnitude and likelihood that it was facially unreasonable, see Lance v. Wyeth, 85 
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A.3d 434, 458–59, 458 n.36 (Pa. 2014) (discussing the common use of an 
alternative design and approving plaintiff’s theory that defendant “tender[ed] into 
the market a drug which it knows or should know is so dangerous that it should not 
be taken by anyone”).  Here, there is neither sufficient record evidence about the 
relative risks of an alternative design nor sufficient record evidence that the stem is 
so dangerous that a jury could find Zimmer’s design choices were unreasonable. 
 Moreover, to the extent Kline presented admissible causation evidence, that 
evidence does not support any of Kline’s theories of unreasonable design.  For 
example, Truman failed to show how increased testing would have resulted in a 
design change; Truman admitted that she did not have “information” to conclude 
that different surface treatment would have prevented the stem fracture; and 
Kline’s metallurgy expert admitted he was not aware of a better material to use for 
the stem.  
 Summary judgment also must be granted to Zimmer on Kline’s failure to 
warn claim.  Kline’s theory, supported by Zimmer’s experts, was that an individual 
of Kline’s weight or body mass index who engaged in vigorous activity was at a 
higher risk of device failure.  As Kline acknowledged, a package insert for 
Zimmer’s device warned about those risks, at least in general terms.4  Truman 
                                                 
4   “Complication or failure of any total hip prosthesis are more likely to 
occur in heavy patients.”   
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opined that there were two defects with these warnings: (1) Zimmer should have 
contraindicated the device and (2) done so for use at specific weights, body mass 
indexes, and/or activity levels.  Truman based her opinion on the fact that one of 
Zimmer’s competitors contraindicated specific combinations of weights and 
activity levels on the competitor’s device.  However, to the extent Truman opined 
that the weaker warning was unreasonable, that opinion is unsubstantiated and 
therefore fails to create a genuine issue of material fact.  See Advo, Inc. v. Phila. 
Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[E]xpert testimony 
without . . . a factual foundation cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.”); 
see also Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 815 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(describing contraindication).  Truman did not indicate, among other things, that 
the competitor’s device was sufficiently analogous to Zimmer’s device, that the 
competitor’s warning was reasonable, that there were any particular weights or 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Complications and/or failure of total hip prostheses. [sic] 
are more likely to occur in patients with unrealistic 
functional expectations, heavy patients, physically active 
patients, and/or with patients who fail to follow through with 
the required rehabilitation program.  Physical activity can 
result in loosening, wear, and/or fracture of the hip implant.  
The prospective implant patient must be counseled about the 
capabilities of the implant and the impact it will have on his 
or her lifestyle.  The patient must be instructed about all 
postoperative restrictions, particularly those related to 
occupational and sports activities . . . .”   
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activity levels at which excessive risk existed, or that the likelihood of fracture was 
high enough to warrant the contraindication.  Accordingly, there is no evidence in 
the record that the risk was of a magnitude to require a contraindication at any 
specific weight, body mass index, or activity level, except that the device broke in 
Kline.  For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
 
